The tragedy of the commons
Common resources are those that are nonexclusive but rival.
They get depleted as more people use them.
Nonexcludable: there are no property rights to them.
For example, fishing, no one can stop you from fishing, but for every fish you have, there is one less for everyone else.
This leads to a destruction of the common resource.
The tragedy of the commons: the tendency of any resource that is unowned, and hence nonexcludable, to be overused and undermaintained.
There is no incentive to conserve because he doesn't own it, so if he doesn't take it, someone else will. Conserving will bring no future benefit.
Solutions:
Command and control: regulations used to try to limit or avoid the tragedy. Often inefficient and ineffective. They slow but don't prevent the tragedy.
Cultural norms: can be effective in relatively small and self-governing communities. Don't fish more than you have to, and you'll get honor from the society.
Creating property rights:
Individual Transferable Quotas: a property right to a certain tonnage of fish. The sum of ITQs is the total allowable catch per year.
ITQs can be bought and sold.
This creates incentive to preserve the resource, as it is already yours, and you will also make sure that others follow the system.
But it is not always possible to create property rights.
The more parties involved, the greater the transactional cost, the less likely an agreement is to happen.
The tragedy of the commons
Common resources are those that are nonexclusive but rival.
They get depleted as more people use them.
Nonexcludable: there are no property rights to them.
For example, fishing, no one can stop you from fishing, but for every fish you have, there is one less for everyone else.
This leads to a destruction of the common resource.
The tragedy of the commons: the tendency of any resource that is unowned, and hence nonexcludable, to be overused and undermaintained.
There is no incentive to conserve because he doesn't own it, so if he doesn't take it, someone else will. Conserving will bring no future benefit.
Solutions:
Command and control: regulations used to try to limit or avoid the tragedy. Often inefficient and ineffective. They slow but don't prevent the tragedy.
Cultural norms: can be effective in relatively small and self-governing communities. Don't fish more than you have to, and you'll get honor from the society.
Creating property rights:
Individual Transferable Quotas: a property right to a certain tonnage of fish. The sum of ITQs is the total allowable catch per year.
ITQs can be bought and sold.
This creates incentive to preserve the resource, as it is already yours, and you will also make sure that others follow the system.
But it is not always possible to create property rights.
The more parties involved, the greater the transactional cost, the less likely an agreement is to happen.